CVE-2026-80772

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon_ctlr_read_handler() joycon_ctlr_read_handler() casts an incoming HID input report to struct joycon_input_report and parses it, guarding the cast only with a 12-byte length check: if (size >= 12) /* make sure it contains the input report */ joycon_parse_report(ctlr, (struct joycon_input_report *)data); struct joycon_input_report is 49 bytes: a 13-byte header followed by a union whose IMU arm is 36 bytes. For an IMU report joycon_parse_report() -> joycon_parse_imu_report() walks that union (struct offsets 13..48), so a report of exactly 12 bytes with data[0] == JC_INPUT_IMU_DATA passes the guard yet is read up to 37 bytes past its declared length. The over-read bytes are decoded into accelerometer/gyroscope values and forwarded to userspace through the "(IMU)" input device, leaking driver-internal memory. data[0] and size are fully controlled by a malicious or spoofed Joy-Con/Pro Controller. Receive buffers are sized to the maximum report length, so this is an over-read within the allocation rather than a slab OOB, but the decoded bytes still reach userspace. The sibling subcmd path in joycon_ctlr_handle_event() already bounds the same cast correctly: if (size < sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) || data[0] != JC_INPUT_SUBCMD_REPLY) break; Use the same sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) bound here.

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EPSS — Exploit Prediction

0.0017

Probability of exploitation

0.07%

Percentile rank

EPSS estimates the probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. A higher score means more likely to be exploited.

References

Other References

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/27b376b945c0aac46fcdfcc950b14a85b874b557 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33ea29f8b6141f2d265de807e110a6435b355cb0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/34725ed4719da424113db8449fb5485aaf71a913 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/51cfd1adbe7a46bb08af162abb3ab3b6820e2d15 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/addca61f9a23c0d20a387c2040e70479f54518e1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bd397c4123a4bc084913d8c7fdb40ef94e9f8172 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d4cabd4089adb59cf7974915737c52cc47a9bb1b

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-80772? +

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon_ctlr_read_handler() joycon_ctlr_read_handler() casts an incoming HID input report to struct joycon_input_report and parses it, guarding the cast only with a 12-byte length check: if (size >= 12) /* make sure it contains the input report */ joycon_parse_report(ctlr, (struct joycon_input_report *)data); struct joycon_input_report is 49 bytes: a 13-byte header followed by a union whose IMU arm is 36 bytes. For an IMU report joycon_parse_report() -> joycon_parse_imu_report() walks that union (struct offsets 13..48), so a report of exactly 12 bytes with data[0] == JC_INPUT_IMU_DATA passes the guard yet is read up to 37 bytes past its declared length. The over-read bytes are decoded into accelerometer/gyroscope values and forwarded to userspace through the "(IMU)" input device, leaking driver-internal memory. data[0] and size are fully controlled by a malicious or spoofed Joy-Con/Pro Controller. Receive buffers are sized to the maximum report length, so this is an over-read within the allocation rather than a slab OOB, but the decoded bytes still reach userspace. The sibling subcmd path in joycon_ctlr_handle_event() already bounds the same cast correctly: if (size < sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) || data[0] != JC_INPUT_SUBCMD_REPLY) break; Use the same sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) bound here.

How do I check if I'm vulnerable to CVE-2026-80772? +

You can use Secably's free Website Scanner to check your website for known vulnerabilities. For infrastructure scanning, use the Port Scanner to identify exposed services that may be affected. Check the vendor advisories linked above for specific patch and version information.