CVE-2026-64403

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: validate option length before reading conf opt value l2cap_get_conf_opt() derives the option length from the attacker-controlled opt->len field and immediately dereferences opt->val (as u8, get_unaligned_le16() or get_unaligned_le32(), or a raw pointer for the default case) before any caller has confirmed that opt->len bytes are present in the buffer. The callers (l2cap_parse_conf_req(), l2cap_parse_conf_rsp() and l2cap_conf_rfc_get()) only detect a malformed option afterwards, once the running length has gone negative, by which point the out-of-bounds read has already executed. An existing post-hoc length check keeps the garbage value from being consumed, so this is not a data leak in the current control flow. It is still a validate-after-use ordering bug: up to 4 bytes are read past the end of the buffer before it is known to contain them, and it is fragile to future changes in the callers. Fix it at the source. Pass the end of the buffer into l2cap_get_conf_opt() and refuse to touch opt->val unless the full option (header + value) fits. Each caller computes an end pointer once before the loop and checks the return value directly instead of inferring the error from a negative length.

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EPSS — Exploit Prediction

0.0022

Probability of exploitation

0.13%

Percentile rank

EPSS estimates the probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. A higher score means more likely to be exploited.

References

Other References

https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/687617555cedfb74c9e3cb85d759b908dcb17856 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6b47bdaacfd0045687880177e0987055d8f4765a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/73abbaf91aa33da87c008fb62c148ade561bb606 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d871e969b941ce25653f7716203a0ea4d07ad4b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/98d93c226bdfaa79bbdd86981921d7f106374225 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/996d3da39899aceb8f4910911a3f19a45a7d9d1b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cca81b4bc672604a84f6d224a55cc77ec7dee619 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f70d4aa88068096f35d73e3a05eff33c0a16b9cd

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-64403? +

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: validate option length before reading conf opt value l2cap_get_conf_opt() derives the option length from the attacker-controlled opt->len field and immediately dereferences opt->val (as u8, get_unaligned_le16() or get_unaligned_le32(), or a raw pointer for the default case) before any caller has confirmed that opt->len bytes are present in the buffer. The callers (l2cap_parse_conf_req(), l2cap_parse_conf_rsp() and l2cap_conf_rfc_get()) only detect a malformed option afterwards, once the running length has gone negative, by which point the out-of-bounds read has already executed. An existing post-hoc length check keeps the garbage value from being consumed, so this is not a data leak in the current control flow. It is still a validate-after-use ordering bug: up to 4 bytes are read past the end of the buffer before it is known to contain them, and it is fragile to future changes in the callers. Fix it at the source. Pass the end of the buffer into l2cap_get_conf_opt() and refuse to touch opt->val unless the full option (header + value) fits. Each caller computes an end pointer once before the loop and checks the return value directly instead of inferring the error from a negative length.

How do I check if I'm vulnerable to CVE-2026-64403? +

You can use Secably's free Website Scanner to check your website for known vulnerabilities. For infrastructure scanning, use the Port Scanner to identify exposed services that may be affected. Check the vendor advisories linked above for specific patch and version information.