CVE-2026-52927

HIGH
Published Jun 24, 2026 Modified Jun 28, 2026

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ebtables: fix OOB read in compat_mtw_from_user Luxiao Xu says: The function compat_mtw_from_user() converts ebtables extensions from 32-bit user structures to kernel native structures. However, it lacks proper validation of the user-supplied match_size/target_size. When certain extensions are processed, the kernel-side translation logic may perform memory accesses based on the extension's expected size. If the user provides a size smaller than what the extension requires, it results in an out-of-bounds read as reported by KASAN. This fix introduces a check to ensure match_size is at least as large as the extension's required compatsize. This covers matches, watchers, and targets, while maintaining compatibility with standard targets. AFAIU this is relevant for matches that need to go though match->compat_from_user() call. Those that use plain memcpy with the user-provided size are ok because the caller checks that size vs the start of the next rule entry offset (which itself is checked vs. total size copied from userspace). The ->compat_from_user() callbacks assume they can read compatsize bytes, so they need this extra check. Based on an earlier patch from Luxiao Xu.

CVSS v3.1 Score

7.8
HIGH
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS — Exploit Prediction

0.0012
Probability of exploitation
0.02%
Percentile rank

EPSS estimates the probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. A higher score means more likely to be exploited.

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-52927? +
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ebtables: fix OOB read in compat_mtw_from_user Luxiao Xu says: The function compat_mtw_from_user() converts ebtables extensions from 32-bit user structures to kernel native structures. However, it lacks proper validation of the user-supplied match_size/target_size. When certain extensions are processed, the kernel-side translation logic may perform memory accesses based on the extension's expected size. If the user provides a size smaller than what the extension requires, it results in an out-of-bounds read as reported by KASAN. This fix introduces a check to ensure match_size is at least as large as the extension's required compatsize. This covers matches, watchers, and targets, while maintaining compatibility with standard targets. AFAIU this is relevant for matches that need to go though match->compat_from_user() call. Those that use plain memcpy with the user-provided size are ok because the caller checks that size vs the start of the next rule entry offset (which itself is checked vs. total size copied from userspace). The ->compat_from_user() callbacks assume they can read compatsize bytes, so they need this extra check. Based on an earlier patch from Luxiao Xu. It has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.8 (HIGH).
How severe is CVE-2026-52927? +
CVE-2026-52927 has a CVSS v3.1 score of 7.8 out of 10, rated HIGH. This is a high-severity vulnerability that should be prioritized for patching. The EPSS score is 0.0012, placing it in the 0th percentile for exploitation probability.
How do I check if I'm vulnerable to CVE-2026-52927? +
You can use Secably's free Website Scanner to check your website for known vulnerabilities. For infrastructure scanning, use the Port Scanner to identify exposed services that may be affected. Check the vendor advisories linked above for specific patch and version information.

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